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Abstract 
To establish whether more consistent/accurate juror decision making is related to faster 
decision making processes which use fewer cues, i.e. fast and frugal heuristic processes. A 
correlational design was implemented, with the co-variables: consistency of verdict decisions 
(participant decision compared to the actual court verdict), decision speed, and cue utilisation 
(the number of cues used to make a final verdict decision). Sixty participants read 
information about six murder trials which were based on real cases, and whose outcome 
verdicts were deemed to be correct by the Scottish legal institution. Three of the cases had 
been handed down ‘not guilty’ verdicts and three had been handed down ‘guilty’ verdicts. 
Participants read opening statements and were then presented with a block of prosecution 
evidence, followed by a block of defence evidence. They were then asked to make a final 
verdict.  All three co-variables were significantly related. Cue utilisation and speed were 
positively correlated, as would be expected. Consistency was negatively and significantly 
related to both speed and cue utilisation. Partial correlations highlighted that cue utilisation 
was the only real variable to have a significant relationship with consistency, and that the 
relationship between speed and consistency was a by-product of how frugal the juror was.  
Findings support the concept of fast and frugal decisional processes being optimal when 
making juror decisions. The more frugal a decision is the more likely jurors are to be to be 
accurate/consistent. 
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Are More Consistent Juror Decisions Related to Fast and Frugal Decision Making? 
Investigating the Relationship between Juror consistency, Decision Speed and Cue 
Utilisation. 
 
Jury decision making has been noted as one of the most frequently researched topics 
within the fields of psychology and law, with a greater volume of trial/‘petit’ jury research 
than grand jury research being carried out (Hans, 1990). While most civil cases in the 
westernised criminal justice system are resolved through settlement (Hans, 1990), the 
significance of juries and the decisions that they facilitate within the criminal justice system 
is still high. This is because the types of cases that they sit on tend to be complex in nature, 
may hold public safety concerns, and tend to be hold greater severity than non-jury trial cases 
(Hans, 1990). In addition, the impact of a verdict within a trial holds significance beyond the 
trial itself, and for more people than the defendant and victim(s). There is also wider impact 
on the mental health and wellbeing of family members and friends of the defendant and the 
victim(s), and potentially to the community. It is therefore imperative that the process 
through which juries reach their decisions is understood, and that these processes are as 
accurate and legally just (fair) as they possibly can be. 
While there have been many studies carried out investigating juror decision making 
outcomes, what is less well known is the process through which jurors form their judgements 
and make their final verdict decisions. To best understand the process of juror decision 
making and to identify whether it is accurate and effective, to the best extent that it can be, 
we propose that, in addition to the existing research investigating jury and juror decisions 
using outcomes data, carefully controlled experimental studies are required which move 
beyond forensic psychology and legal research methods, to incorporate decision science 
approaches: that is, the investigation of decisional styles of jurors, the amount and types of 
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information (decision cues) they use, the speed at which they make their decisions, and the 
associated accuracy of these decisions linked to these factors. Previous decision science 
research has studied decision making in environments where accuracy can be accurately 
measured, however. Nevertheless, in the current investigation accuracy cannot be measured, 
because the researchers did not know what actually occurred in the homicide scenarios, as 
they were based on real life cases. Although, the researchers can measure how consistent the 
verdict choices of mock jurors in the current investigation were with the verdict choices given 
by the real life jurors. Furthermore, the current quasi-experiment will empirically investigate 
if heuristic processes share a relationship with juror consistency, in a similar manner to how 
traditional decision scientists measure how heuristic processes relate to accuracy. 
The current research therefore investigated whether heuristics (i.e., cognitive shortcuts 
to decision making; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981) were used by jurors when making 
decisions about different trials, and whether these heuristics were associated with the jurors’ 
verdict choice consistency in comparison to those given by the real jurors of the trials 
selected. We argue that only through identifying naturalistic juror decision making processes, 
can we better understand them and, in time, shape juror specific guidance within the criminal 
justice system to best facilitate these processes. The current research is a first step in 
empirically identifying the naturalistic decisional processes of jurors. 
A ground-breaking study by Dhami and Ayton (2001) investigated the decision 
making processes of judges in civil (non-jury) cases which sought to identify whether the 
defendant should be sentenced or released. The researchers were interested in the volume of 
information (number of decision cues) needed by judges to reach a decision about the case. 
The findings were surprising from a lay-perspective: judges’ reached decisions using as little 
as one piece of evidence (or ‘cue’), with the mean number of cues needed to reach a decision 
being 1.1. The findings indicated that rather than rationally weighting and evaluating all of 
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the available cues, judges used a heuristic decision making process, which allowed speed and 
small amounts of cues to be used to reach a decision: i.e., the judges were using Fast and 
Frugal decision making processes, specifically in this study, the Matching Heuristic (Dhami 
& Ayton, 2001). This heuristic matches information from a specific case with a stereotypical 
version based on the decision makers own experience (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). This, 
therefore, allows the decision maker to make efficient inferences from a frugal amount of 
relevant cues and their own experience. The matching heuristics may also be promoted in a 
court room because of time pressures (Dhami & Ayton, 2001). 
This research is meaningful to the juror decision making context as both the context 
around the decisions being made are similar, and the types of decisions are similar. Judges 
form judgements and make decisions under uncertainty (Dhami & Ayton, 2001); so too do 
jurors. They do not have an opportunity to reflect on the outcomes of the decisions that they 
make, they are under time pressure, and the information that they have may be incomplete or 
piecemeal, reducing the opportunity for rational weighting of all variables. It may therefore 
be hypothesised that the decisional processes will be similar: jurors will use Fast and Frugal 
decision making processes in a similar way to judges. What is not easily drawn from this 
comparison, though, is whether these Fast and Frugal processes (if they are present) will be 
associated with a consistent verdict choice. 
However, there are some differences between jurors and judges. For instance, judges 
have more experience and knowledge in relation to court cases than jurors. This lack of 
experience in jurors may actually promote fast and frugal decision making through. 
Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) suggested that decision makers use fast and frugal heuristics 
when they cannot base their decision exclusively from knowledge stored in the mind. Further, 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) proposed that having less knowledge surrounding a 
particular topic actually leads to more efficient and accurate decision making, as the less 
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expertise the decision maker has, the easier it is for them to differentiate between the 
outcomes available. Although, a knowledge base between an expert and a layperson is 
optimal in relation to fast and frugal decision making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
Furthermore, a juror’s lack of knowledge/experience may promote fast and frugal heuristics. 
Previous decision making research has outlined and described in depth the processes 
through which judgements are formed and decisions are made. However, previous juror-
specific decision making models, such as the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992) 
cannot give a good indication of juror accuracy (MacCoun, 1989). There are two overarching 
theories within decision science which may be more helpful in understanding juror decisions. 
One, fast and frugal heuristics, suggests that heuristics can be positive and may lead to 
correct decisions (Gigerenzer & Goldtsein, 1996). The other, the heuristics and biases 
programme, focusses more on the negatives of heuristics and the biases they create (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974, 1981). It is not clear, in the context of juror decision making, however, 
whether heuristics are positive or negative in promoting decision accuracy/consistency.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981) revolutionised decision making research by 
suggesting that rational models, were optimal. However, they suggested that human decision 
making was not always rational. In their pivotal work, Tversky and Kahneman, (1974, 1981) 
proposed that heuristics allowed individuals to make judgements which were quick and easy 
(Sanfey & Chang, 2008), yet potentially biased. Critics, however, suggest that we need to 
look at more than the internal processes when we study decision making (Simon, 1956). In 
contrast, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) proposed that fast and frugal heuristics may be 
useful for individuals, allowing them to differentiate between opposing alternatives 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) suggest that heuristics are 
non-compensatory, adaptive, and that a diverse set of heuristics may be available to decision 
makers. This allows individuals to adapt their decision making strategies to environments 
FAST AND FRUGAL JUROR DECISIONS   8 
 
 
 
based on the fact that certain rule of thumb techniques may be better suited than others 
(Mellers, Shwartz, & Cooke, 1998), supporting the notion that an information search that is 
biased may be positive, as it points people in the right direction (Snook & Cullen, 2008). 
The fast and frugal model described by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) is a 
probabilistic mental model, which suggests that decision makers can make fast and frugal 
inferences based on known cue validities, if information from memory cannot be used on its 
own (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer, 2002). These quick inferences, which are 
based on relatively few pieces of information can lead to accurate decisions (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996); contradicting rational theories of decision making, as there is no accuracy 
versus speed trade off (Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999; Lee, 
Newell, & Vandekerckhove, 2014). The point where information search halts within these 
models is called the stopping rule. The stopping rule is promoted when a cue is found that 
allows one of the outcomes to be favoured. The outcome that is favoured by the satisficing 
cue is then favoured (i.e. the decision rule; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Further, the 
outcome that has a positive match with the discriminatory cue will be chosen if the other 
outcomes relationship with the cue is either negative or unknown. In summary, information 
search continues from the decision makers memory until satisfying information is found, 
which then allows a decision to be made (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) frugal algorithm has been shown to relate to highly 
accurate decisions being made (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). For instance, Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein’s (1996) found that students were better at making decisions when they had less 
knowledge of a particular area (e.g., city size) and were frugal in their use of cues 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). This highlights that biases towards using a small amount of 
information may improve performance (Snook & Cullen, 2008).  
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Both of the heuristic models discussed have different implications for the court room. 
Fast and frugal models would suggest that lengthy trials may decrease decision accuracy. 
Further, they would suggest that by cognitively overwhelming the juror, it is harder for them 
to distinguish between valid cues and ‘noise’. In contrast, the heuristics and biases 
programme would suggest that regardless of what the court does the same outcomes will 
occurs. For instance, if a lot of information is provided, jurors will ignore this information 
and use extra-legal factors such as race and gender to make sup-optimal decisions. And, if 
jurors are provided with a small amount of information, jurors will probably still rely on 
heuristics and cognitive fallacies, and may then utilise extra-legal information, such as gender 
and race, when making decisions, thus deviating their decision making processes from a more 
rational approach (Dhami & Ayton, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1981).  
It is clear that there is contradictory evidence in regards to the implications of 
heuristics. The main elements of this contradiction focus on cue utilisation, the speed at 
which a decision is made, and the consistency of the decision. There is currently a dearth of 
research specifically investigating juror decision making within the fast and frugal paradigm, 
with the majority of existent research focusing on juror ‘stories’ or decisional outcomes (e.g., 
Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The current research will investigate these variables to establish 
whether heuristic processes are present in jurors, and whether these are associated with 
consistency verdict choice. It is hypothesised that: 
H1: There will be a significant association between decision making speed and verdict 
consistency. 
H2: There will be a significant association between verdict consistency and cue 
utilisation. 
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H3: There will be a significant and positive association between cue utilisation and 
decision making speed.  
 
Method 
Design 
The research used a correlational design to investigate relationships across three co-
variables: speed (time it took individuals to make a decision); cue utilisation (number of cues 
used calculated based on the last cue the participant needed to make a decision); and verdict 
consistency (whether participants made verdicts that were correct, based on the outcome 
given in the real life trials). 
 
Participants 
Sixty participants (31 females, 29 males) with a mean age of 26.8 years (SD = 9.6 
years) took part in the study. Twenty-one participants were students, with the remaining 
participants being a mixture of unemployed, professionally and manually employed 
individuals. Overall 360 decisions were made (60 participants made judgements on six trials 
each), which indicates a suitable range and number of judgements being made and is 
comparable to other respected research using vignette based decision making tasks (e.g., 
Dhami, 2003, at 342 judgements). Three post hoc G*power tests were conducted to test the 
power of the statistical tests (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The G*power was ran 
with a Bivariate normal model, with two tails, and error probability of .05, and a total sample 
size of sixty. Three different effect sizes were input through. The first G*power analysis 
investigated the power between consistency and speed, a medium effect size of .34 was input, 
an observed power of .77 (or .8 when rounded to one decimal place) was output. The second 
G*power analysis investigated the power between cue utilisation and consistency, the effect 
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size of .42 was input, and a power of .93 was observed. Finally, the last G*power analysis 
investigated the power between cue utilisation and speed, a large effect size of .73 was input, 
and an observed power of .99 was output. Furthermore, all correlations were adequately 
powered.  
Opportunity sampling and snowballing techniques were employed, placing posters 
and recruitment advertisements both on university campuses and via social media, with 
participants being encouraged to pass on the study details to others. To increase ecological 
validity and align with eligibility for Scottish juror selection (Scottish Court Service, 2015; 
the study was based in Scotland), the inclusion criteria dictated that participants were to be 
aged between 18-65 years. The exclusion criteria indicated that people could not participate if 
they had been sentenced in court in the last five years, if they had been imprisoned for three 
months within the last seven years, or if they were not on the electoral role. 
 
Materials 
All participants received standardised information sheets, consent forms, and 
debriefing sheets. The information sheet contained details about the study and researchers, 
and also contained a slight deception: that the results of the research were going to be used by 
lawyers for appeals, to induce a greater sense of importance. This was later revealed as false 
in the debriefing sheet at the conclusion of the study. A demographics questionnaire was 
given which asked for participant gender, age, and occupation. 
Vignettes. Six vignettes were developed based on real cases for this research: three 
described cases which had received a Guilty verdict in the real world sitting, and three 
described cases where a Not Guilty verdict had been received. Participants viewed all 
vignettes. The development of the vignettes followed published guidance on vignette 
development (i.e. Ashill & Yavas, 2006; Heverly, Fitt, & Newman, 1984). The vignettes in 
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the current experiment were similar lengths to prevent biases in terms of how much each case 
was attended too. The cues (pieces of evidence) shown in the vignettes were all relevant to 
the research aims. All of the vignettes provided the names and genders of the suspects and 
victims. Across the vignettes, consistent information was shown in comparable orders (in line 
with vignette development guidance by Murray et al., 2016). Prosecution evidence was 
always shown first, followed by defence evidence. Finally, vignettes were developed to be 
moderate and similar in length. See Appendices 1-2 for more information regarding vignette 
development and balancing.  
The case information contained in the vignettes was drawn from real cases which had 
been tried by jury in Scotland, and which were reported in newspapers and/or court 
transcripts, freely available online. The names of the individuals and places from the real life 
trials were changed. All cases had a specific Guilty or Not Guilty verdict, which had either 
not been appealed or which had been upheld following appeal. 
The ages and gender of the suspects and victims in the cases were similar, and the 
criminal charge (homicide) was the same. Piloting was carried out to ensure that the realism, 
severity, and familiarity of the cases were similar throughout the six trials (see Appendices). 
Vignettes were on average 484 words long. The mean opening statement length for guilty 
verdicts was 115 (SD = 7) words, and the mean length of the opening statement was 115.67 
(SD = 12.58) words; a paired samples t-test indicated that there was no significant differences 
in relation to word length between the different types of cases (t (2) =-0.19, p =0.87, d =0.07). 
The types of evidence were also similar throughout: biological, eyewitness, and secondary 
confession evidence were used. 
Vignettes contained between 10-18 pieces of evidence (cues); 5-9 pieced of evidence 
for each prosecution and defence across the trials. The rationale for the number of cues was 
to keep the evidence number for each stance between Miller’s (1956) 7+-2 working memory 
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rule to ensure that the volume of information would not lead to cognitive overload and 
impede memory. The number of cues varied between trials to allow the trials to be as 
generalizable as possible as trials do not always present the same number of cues. 
The six vignettes were presented using the software Super-Lab (version .50), with the order 
of the trials being counterbalanced after every 20 participants to reduce potential order 
effects. Super-Lab was used to track progress, collect the participant input data (see 
procedure) and to record response speeds. 
 
Procedure 
Participants read a standardised information sheet and completed a consent form prior 
to participation. They were then asked the juror eligibility questions and completed their 
demographic information. Participants were given on-screen instructions of how to respond 
in the trials and also had a printed copy of the instructions beside them. For each trial, they 
were provided with an opening statement, to provide context to the case. Participants were 
then asked to read over individual pieces of evidence (ranging from 10 pieces on the smallest 
case to 18 on the largest case), and were asked to rate each piece of evidence as ‘G’, ‘N’, or 
‘P’ (guilty, not guilty, not proven, respectively) and in a likelihood rating of 1 to 100 (1 
representing definitely not guilty, 50 showing the verdict has not yet been proven and 100 
symbolising definitely guilty; see footnote for more details here). Once all of the evidence 
(cues) had been rated, participants were asked to give a final verdict. There were three 
verdicts available: guilty (G), not guilty (N) and not proven (P). Participants were then asked 
to state the last piece of evidence they needed to reach a decision. This highlighted the last 
cue needed by a participant, which then allowed an overall response time to be calculated in 
relation to making a decision. Likewise, it allowed an absolute stopping rule, in line with fast 
FAST AND FRUGAL JUROR DECISIONS   14 
 
 
 
and frugal heuristics, to be quantified. Once the participants had completed all trials, they 
were fully debriefed.  
 
Results 
Three outliers were present, which occurred in the variable ‘consistency’. The outliers 
were not removed due to the small sample and the small numbers of outliers. Response time 
data within one participant for one case was missing due to an error in the data collection 
using Super-Lab. These data were treated as missing and were imputed as averages. Two 
participants chose not to provide a final verdict on trial six. A mean consistency score was 
calculated for each participant.  
The data were averaged for each of the six trials per participant for Pearson’s 
correlations to be conducted. In each of the six trials, a judgement of ‘Not Proven’ was 
marked as incorrect (i.e. coded as zero) and a Not Guilty verdict given in a guilty trial (or 
vice versa) was also coded as incorrect. Correct verdicts were coded as ‘1’. The number of 
correct verdicts over the trials were added together, and then divided by six, which then 
allowed averaged data to be produced.  Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
averages of participants’ verdict consistency, decision speed (measured in milliseconds), and 
cue utilisation over the six trials. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Pearson’s correlations were carried out to investigate whether there would be 
relationships across the co-variables consistency, speed, and cue utilisation. The correlation 
coefficients and coefficients of determination are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2 about here 
 
All three co-variables were significantly related, with consistency and speed 
demonstrating a significant, moderate, negative relationship (r(60)=-0.34, p=0.01, r2=0.12). 
This indicates that with a shorter time taken to reach a verdict, the more likely the 
participants were to be consistent. There was also a significant, moderate, negative 
relationship between consistency and cue utilisation (r(60)=-0.42, p=0.01, r2=0.18), 
indicating that the fewer cues that a person needs to reach a verdict, then the more consistent 
they were likely to be.  
In contrast, the relationship between speed and cue utilisation were significant, but 
positive and with a large effect size (r(60)=0.73, p<0.001, r2=0.53). This indicates that the 
longer it takes an individual to reach a verdict, then the more cues the person will have 
utilised in their decision making process; as would be expected . 
 
A partial correlation was then carried out, controlling for speed in the relationship 
between cue utilisation and consistency. The correlation coefficient was found to decrease: 
(r(57)=-0.27, p=0.04, r2=0.07). This indicates that, regardless of speed, the less cues that a 
person uses the more consistent their decision will be. When cue utilisation is controlled for 
when investigating the relationship between speed and consistency the relationship becomes 
non-significant: (r(57)=-0.049, p=0.71, r2=<0.01). 
 
Discussion 
Statement of principal findings 
The current research investigated whether speed, consistency and cue utilisation were 
significantly related in a juror decision making context. It was hypothesised that there would 
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be a significant association between speed and consistency, cue utilisation and consistency, 
and speed and cue utilisation; with the former two hypotheses being key in identifying 
whether jurors are following fast and frugal type decisional processes to reach more 
consistent verdict choices. All three hypotheses were supported. 
The findings indicated that as the time that a juror takes to make a decision increases, 
their consistency decreases. Previous theoretical arguments have demonstrated conflicting 
propositions in regard to the time taken to make decisions and consistency. For instance, the 
heuristics and biases programme suggested that quick decisions may cause inaccuracies 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Conversely, fast and frugal theorists have proposed that quick 
decisions have good accuracy rates (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The current findings 
support the latter approach: that the quicker a juror’s decision is reached, the more consistent 
the jurors decisions were in regards to previous real life verdicts. Once again, it should be 
mentioned that in previous decision making literature that accuracy is a commonly studied 
variable. However, accuracy could not be measured in the current investigation because the 
trial vignettes were based on real life cases, and the researchers did not know what the 
appropriate outcomes of the cases were. Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to instead 
measure consistency (how similar mock juror verdicts were with the verdicts given by the 
real life jurors). Further, the researchers used the term of consistency in the current 
investigation, where other decision science investigations have used the term accuracy, in an 
attempt to see if jurors use heuristics.  
Similarly, the findings indicated that those jurors who used fewer cues actually 
demonstrated superior consistency in their verdict decisions. As with the previous 
speed/consistency relationship, the previous research and theoretical bases for directioning 
this hypothesis are conflicting. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) approach would propose that 
the more frugal the decision making strategy was, the more potentially biased the mock juror 
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could be. This may then lead to an incorrect verdict (Findley & Scott, 2006). The theories 
proposed by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and Simon (1956), however, would suggest 
that the more frugal the individual was in cue utilisation, then the more likely they would be 
to give a correct response.  
In addition, as Fast and Frugal jury decision making appears to correlate with 
accurate/consistent decision making, lawyers may consider ordering their evidence in a way 
that promotes certain heuristics. For instance, if lawyers order their evidence along a validity 
gradient, from most valid to least valid piece of evidence, they may promote frugal decision 
making processes to occur, which may then promote consistent and efficient decision making 
to occur. By placing DNA evidence first, for example, followed by weaker pieces of 
evidence, it may allow jurors to reach their decision frugally and accurately, making jury 
deliberations and court cases, in general, more efficient.   
Considering the importance of the speed of decisions versus the number of cues used, 
and their relationship to consistent verdict choices, when speed was controlled for, cue 
utilisation and consistency maintained their significant relationship. This means that the 
relationship between cue utilisation and consistency is not due to speed. Thus, the fewer the 
cues used when making a decision as a juror, the more likely an individual was of being 
consistent, regardless of speed. It can, therefore, be argued that the more frugal a decision 
maker is the more consistent they will be. It was also found that when cue utilisation was 
controlled, the relationship between threshold speed and consistency became non-significant. 
This would then suggest that merely making a decision quickly does not mean that you will 
reach an accurate/consistent decision.  What really matters in reaching an accurate decision is 
frugally using cues. The current piece of research may therefore suggest that frugalness is 
more important than quickness in the jury context. In other words, individuals who use a 
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satisficing amount of cues are more likely to both make decisions quickly and are more likely 
to reach accurate outcomes (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
 
Strengths and weaknesses of the study 
The current research is the first empirical support of fast and frugal research within a 
juror context, to the authors’ best knowledge. However, theoretical research from Snook and 
Cullen (2008) also suggested that ‘biased’ decision making may be beneficial in a theoretical 
context. These researchers focussed on tunnel vision, which suggests that police officers, and 
potentially jurors, use biased decision making mechanisms to only use a satisficing amount of 
evidence (Snook & Cullen, 2008). The researchers proposed that it is unlikely that humans in 
a legal setting can use all the information provided to come to a rationally weighted outcome 
(Snook & Cullen, 2008). They also highlight that using realistic (i.e. fast and frugal 
heuristics) decision making strategies, rather than traditional normative rationality, may 
actually help individuals who analyse forensic and legal information in order to make an 
accurate decision (Snook & Cullen, 2008). The same process may be occurring in the present 
findings. These two studies, taken in consort, indicate that fast and frugal processes may 
allow decision makers to make accurate/consistent and efficient decisions. 
The research was also conducted using a computer in a lab-based setting. This 
artificial setting, with the lack of real-life, social cues, may have affected the decision making 
processes of the participants, and made what was observed in this experiment different from 
what may have occurred in a real-life experiment (Simon, 1956; Wiener, Krauss, & 
Lieberman, 2011). For instance, the length of the trials were necessarily relatively short in 
this experiment, with the duration of completing the experiment varying between 50-90 
minutes. This may, therefore, affect the decision making process in a number of ways, such 
as promoting biases. This preference on speed, and the fact that less information was 
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available may have promoted the use of satisfying, which may explain some of the results 
that were found (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).  
It is unlikely that the lack of ecological validity did affect the decision making 
processes of the jurors, though. Results from previous research that focussed on ecological 
validity and its effects (Pezdek, Avila‐Mora, & Sperry, 2010) found that no significant 
differences were observed between participants using transcripts vs participants viewing 
filmed vignettes. This may then highlight that decision making process is not affected by 
ecological validity (Hastie, Penrod, Pennington, 1983; MacCoun, 1989).  
 
Meaning of the study: possible mechanisms and implications for clinicians or 
policymakers 
The current research findings indicate that heuristics may be beneficial to decision 
makers in a legal environment: jurors who use a small number of cues demonstrate increased 
consistency in comparison to those who use more cues. This suggests that satisficing may be 
beneficial (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1956). The findings therefore do not 
support the applicability of the heuristics and biases programme (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974) or normative approaches within juror decision making, but instead appear to support 
fast and frugal (or specifically frugal) heuristics, which suggest that heuristics can lead to 
accurate/consistent decisions, and that heuristics may be an essential part of human decision 
making (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). However, the current investigation has not 
highlighted which pieces of information may allow a decision to be reached quicker. Previous 
research from Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that the first piece of information 
provided to the decision maker acts as an anchor and may then effect the rest of a decision. 
Therefore, the first piece of evidence presented in court may anchor the juror’s perception of 
guilt, thus having an asymmetrical effect on rest of the juror’s decision making process. 
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Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) proposed that valid pieces of information, like DNA 
evidence, that allow outcomes, such as guilty and not guilty, to be discriminated against, 
cause decisions to be made frugally and accurately. Consequently, future research would like 
to test the effects that evidence order and validity may have on both juror decision processes 
and verdict frequency.  
This support for the fast and frugal approach has implications both academically and 
practically. It proposes that Fast and Frugal heuristics are used in the courtroom to make 
decisions that may be consistent. This is somewhat counterintuitive and needs further 
research, with larger samples and across less experimentally controlled, more ecologically 
valid research settings. Nevertheless, the current findings may tentatively imply that short 
cases, which are straight to the point and which only present case-relevant and non-piecemeal 
information to jurors may be more beneficial to the legal system in terms of time/cost-
effectiveness in decision making time and in accurate/consistent juror decisions. 
Should the findings of this early study into jury decisional processes and consistency 
hold in replications and related future research, strong implications for the current jury 
processes within the criminal justice system must be considered. There is the potential to 
restrict the amount of information presented in court, and for only the most valid pieces of 
information to be presented in court. By ensuring that the legal environment is non-
compensatory, it may promote fast and frugal decision making to occur, thus increasing the 
likelihood of jurors giving an accurate/consistent outcome (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
 
Unanswered questions and future research 
Future research would be advised to aim to disentangle the processes behind the 
results in the current research. The results showed that consistency is negatively related to 
cue utilisation. But, what process is driving this? One explanation may come from Gigerenzer 
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and Goldstein’s (1996) fast and frugal heuristics. Another alternative explanation may be that 
the stopping point be relative, mirroring a threshold model where information is integrated 
until a boundary is reached (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004). Future research will investigate which 
metaphor of decision making, either heuristics or thresholds, is most applicable to juror 
decision making.  
The current findings suggest that Fast and Frugal decision making processes may be 
beneficial to juror decision making. This has significant implications for psychologists and 
legal scholars as it may highlight that heuristics may be beneficial to jurors; in contrast to the 
very deliberative and drawn out existing structures and processes associated with courtroom 
trials. Specifically, frugal cue utilisation seems important in order for accurate decisions to be 
reached. Future research in more ecologically valid settings, such as mock trial settings and 
including group dynamics within the research design would be beneficial in identifying 
whether the current findings hold true in less controlled experimental settings. 
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Footnote 
The cue ratings (i.e. whether participated counter the evidence as G, N or P and 
likelihoods) were not used in the current analysis, as a future paper will focus on this. Also, 
the not proven verdict is generally considered as the middle verdict, yet it is not legally 
defined (Duff, 1999).  
Not proven cases were not used in this analysis, as the definition of not proven means 
that the verdict cannot be correct as the person was either guilty or not guilty. Therefore, not 
proven cases were omitted from this study. Not proven outcomes could be given though, 
because in a Scottish court room it is possible for a jury to wrongly give a Not Proven 
verdict, when they should have gave a guilty (or a not guilty) verdict. 
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Table 1 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the verdict consistency, decision time to reach verdict 
(speed), and cue utilisation.  
 
 
  
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Verdict 
Consistency 
0 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Speed (ms) 39921.7 214130.5 110731.4 174208.8 37662.3 
Cue Utilisation (N) 3.8 12.8 9 9.3 2.1 
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Table 2.  
Table 2: Pearson’s r and r2 values across the three co-variables. 
 
 
Speed Cue Utilisation 
r r2 r r2 
Consistency 0.73** 0.54   
Cue Utilisation -0.34* 0.11 -0.42* 1.17 
*p<0.01, **p<0.001 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Counterbalancing table supporting the vignette design process: descriptive 
details about the case. 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty 
Familiarity 
with Victim 
2 familiar, 1 not 1 familiar, 2 not 
Vulnerable 
Victim 
2 vulnerable, 1 not 1 vulnerable, 2 not 
Crime Type 
Housebreak/stabbing 
Argument/multiple injuries 
Body not found 
Head injury/strangled 
Neck injury/oxygen affixation 
Self-defence/stabbing 
Victim ages 
(years) 
51, 16, 33 19, 44, 26 
Victim Gender 2 female, 1 male 1 female, 2 male 
Accused Ages 
(years) 
20, 22, 39 23, 33, 49 
Accused 
Gender 
3 males 3 males 
Weapon Used 2 yes, 1 unknown 2 yes, 1 no 
Opening 
Statement 
Length (N) 
123, 110, 112 
Mean =115 
129,104, 114 
Mean=115.7 
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Appendix 2. Counterbalancing table supporting the vignette design process: details of number 
of cues across prosecution and defence evidence, severity ratings, participant familiarity 
ratings, and participant rated realism ratings. The latter three ratings were determined in pilot 
trailing of the vignettes. 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty 
Number of Prosecution 
Evidence Cues 
7 6 
Number of Defence 
Evidence Cues 
7 6 
Severity (mean) 4.13 4.02 
Familiarity (mean) 2.00 2.06 
Realism (mean) 3.58 3.90 
Note. Severity, Familiarity and Realism rated on 1-5 point scales, with higher scores 
indicating higher ratings. 
